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ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis examines the contributions of psychiatrist Harry Stack Sullivan (1892-
1949) to an ongoing conversation on the self and society in the United States, 
from classical liberal political theory to the mid-twentieth century social sciences. 
Existing literature overlooks the 1940s as a divided period in American 
intellectual history. This project argues that an accurate presentation of the era 
demands the inclusion of thinkers who were excluded from mainstream 
institutions as a consequence of their training in ‘professional’ academic 
disciplines or social marginalization along the lines of race, ethnicity, religion, 
gender, or sexuality. Careful examination of Sullivan’s lectures, scholarly articles, 
unpublished manuscripts, and biographical material locates his place in this 
conversation and further highlights the influence of his experiences as a gay, 
working-class, Irish-Catholic psychiatrist on his innovative theories. Sullivan’s 
ideas addressed aspects of life in the United States ignored by established 
academics, shaping the subjects and methods later associated with the very 
institutions from which he was excluded and resonating with late-twentieth 
century advances in queer theory. This thesis contributes to the expansion of 
intellectual history to include thinkers from a greater diversity of personal 
backgrounds who hypothesized foundational changes to a mainstream American 
society from which they were excluded. 
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David Riesman’s The Lonely Crowd, a sociological analysis of the “changing American 
character,” was published in 1950 and immediately captured the imagination of the 
American middle-class reading public. Riesman posited that fundamental changes to 
American society in the previous decades had undermined the authority of introspective 
individuality in favor of a malleable figure that changed in relation to society’s demands. 
The contemplative search for an authentic, or “inner-directed,” self that concerned earlier 
generations of intellectuals gave way to Riesman’s “other-directed” individual that 
discovered identity and success in reflecting accepted social norms.1 Riesman intended 
to support American individuality in a new theory of social humanism, imbuing the 
individual with a deeper understanding of existing social values. This thoroughgoing 
concern with the concepts of ‘self’ and ‘society’ preoccupied political thinkers in the 
United States from its founding.2 Questioning the possibility of attaining unique 
individuality first emerged as part of the seventeenth century liberal political tradition and 
has continued across intellectual movements into the present. At the turn of the 
twentieth century, pragmatism established a process of intellectual inquiry that replaced 
the prevailing liberal faith in a hierarchy of absolute revealed truths with a system of 
relative truths that could only be agreed upon through conversation.3 Pragmatist 
intellectuals inaugurated a new theory grounded in the propensity of human beings to 
change over time. The pragmatist moment was in recession in the early 1930s and the 
social scientific revolution that included Riesman had started. Mark Greif argues that the 
American midcentury commenced in this moment of uncertainty and included a 
distinctive form of intellectual activity known as the “age of the crisis of man”.4 
 Greif rejects the tendency in American intellectual history to treat the 1940s “as 
interim years of war” or “as a divided period, a wishbone that goes half to the ‘thirties’ 
and half to the ‘fifties.’” His interpretation of political and social thought in the 1940s 
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bypassed philosophy, theology, and traditional academic disciplines, arguing instead 
that “the novel had the obligation to humanize a fallen mankind.”5 Angus Burgin argues, 
however, that in looking exclusively to literature as the source of innovative ideas, “Greif 
has written a history of philosophy that is skeptical of the philosophical enterprise.” 
Greif’s skepticism leads him to turn a blind eye to the ideas that countless American 
intellectuals of various disciplines articulated through the language of political theory in 
the immediate postwar period. Burgin posits that “A different version of Greif’s book 
might have explored the echoes of these conversations in an American context, as 
homegrown and émigré theologians and philosophers attempted to develop a 
humanistic worldview that suited the needs of their moment.”6 While Greif appropriately 
rejects a widespread tendency in intellectual history to bypass the 1940s, I join Burgin in 
arguing that Greif’s emphasis on literature as the sole medium of midcentury 
intellectualism likewise overlooks those thinkers who created a philosophical bridge 
between existing knowledge of the self and the inchoate demands of postwar society.  
An accurate intellectual history of the 1930s and 40s requires the inclusion of 
thinkers who were excluded from mainstream intellectual institutions as a consequence 
of their training in ‘professional’ academic disciplines or social marginalization along the 
lines of race, ethnicity, religion, gender, or sexuality. Their theories addressed aspects of 
life in the United States ignored by established academics, concurrently shaping the 
subjects and methods later associated with the very institutions from which they were 
excluded. The ideas articulated by prewar and wartime thinkers in overlooked intellectual 
spaces became central to political and social thought in the United States after the 
Second World War. One of these overlooked thinkers is psychiatrist Harry Stack 
Sullivan.7 Sullivan’s psychiatric theories led him to actively participate in ongoing 
conversations of self and society in the United States. The following intellectual history of 
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Harry Stack Sullivan will demonstrate the innovative philosophical ideas developed in 
the United States in this period, the influence of political thought articulated through 
academic disciplines that were not expressly philosophical, and the role of individuals 
who did not identify as white, Protestant, or middle-class in changing the ideas and 
identities later taken for granted by mainstream society.8 Sullivan’s humanistic social and 
political thought is an important, previously overlooked contribution to intellectual history 
in the United States. 
Sullivan (1892 – 1949) read political theory from a perspective shaped by his 
own experiences as a gay, working-class, Irish-Catholic intellectual and his professional 
psychiatric interventions with patients at the margins of American society.9 His medical 
and philosophical essays published between 1924 and 1947 advocated for a host of 
changes to psychiatric institutions.10 Such institutions included hospital spaces and 
treatment methods designed to discipline those categorized as mentally and sexually 
abnormal. Existing mental hospitals organized treatment around the argument that 
individuals could be reformed, or made to conform to normalized patterns of behavior.11 
Sullivan argued that biological, cultural, social, and historical factors in the United States 
were not merely political, but personal. Psychiatric treatment was most effective when it 
unpacked an individual’s personality characteristics, or the relatively enduring pattern of 
representations that signified an individual’s place in real or imagined interpersonal 
relations.12 Each personality contained an accumulated body of referents attached to 
past, present, and perceived future social norms.13  
The self explained by Sullivan’s theories evolved from his interactions with 
patients who were designated socially ‘non-normal,’ or who needed adjustment to the 
established norms, by mainstream institutions. He observed the influence of sexual, 
racial, ethnic, psychological, religious, and socioeconomic exclusion on the ongoing 
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formation of the self through these interactions. Sullivan’s psychiatric theories rejected 
the absolute knowledge that classical liberal political theory claimed to possess of a 
unique human individuality tied to contractual agency. Rather, Sullivan hypothesized that 
his patients possessed a malleable individuality that emerged in a psychologically 
informed social space. His patients articulated their individuality through a personified 
self, the subjective “I” or objective “me,” referenced and shaped by formative 
interpersonal relations. Sullivan argued that individuals expressed their sense of self 
through the language of experience. These experiences included both individual 
behavior and the language used retrospectively to rationalize specific actions.14 The 
concept of individual personality included all human experiences and established a 
framework that enabled an individual to find themselves within the web of interpersonal 
relations.15 Sullivan’s theories placed the individual inside a ceaseless process of 
personality cultivation through actions and social appraisals within interpersonal 
relations. 
Maintaining a sense of self required individuals to act in relation to established 
patterns of interpersonal relations. Sullivan argued that socially informed selfhood 
always referenced “integrating tendencies [that] are conceived to be in the 
psychobiological substrata of the corresponding integrated interpersonal situation.”16 
Interpersonal relations referenced an accumulated body of historical, biological, cultural, 
and social norms. If an individual perceived a conflict between any aspect of the 
personified self and the social norms disciplined by society, Sullivan hypothesized that 
the individual would experience affective uncertainty, or anxiety. Individuals and 
societies affected by a strong sense of uncertainty created systems of rationalization or 
prejudice that was often rooted in previously dominant social norms and values. The 
process of interpersonal relations existed in a particular society and across history. 
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Interpersonal relations required individuals to locate their present concerns in the context 
of past norms and anticipated relationships in the future. Sullivan crafted a humanistic 
social theory that identified mainstream patterns of human relations and questioned the 
persistence of antiquated, exclusionary social norms in establishing a renewed faith in 
the potential of human beings. 
The innovative theories that emerged in Sullivan’s articles and essays were 
articulated through an interdisciplinary lingua franca of the early twentieth century social 
sciences.  This interdisciplinary vocabulary integrated recent advances in psychiatry, 
psychology, anthropology, political science, and sociology in a common conversation.17 
Sullivan’s concepts, and their application in clinical research, were influenced by his 
active participation in the most pressing intellectual conversations of his day. At the 
same time, these concepts appear to anticipate many of the central intellectual 
preoccupations during the second half of the twentieth century. Contemporary students 
of postmodernism and queer theory can find strong resonances between Sullivan’s 
theories of sexuality and selfhood and theories developed by Michel Foucault, Elizabeth 
Grosz, Dana Seitler Judith Butler, Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, and the related inquiries of 
J.L. Austin and Irving Goffman. Careful consideration of these theories from the late 
twentieth and early twenty-first century opens up new readings of Sullivan’s ideas and 
exhibits the prescience of many of his innovative hypotheses. 
* * * 
In a 1976 lecture at the Collége de France, Michel Foucault argued that “power’s 
hold over life” from the nineteenth century through his present was central to 
understanding human society and necessarily lead to a theory of biopower.18 The 
ascendance of the nation-state coincided with the emergence of a new social and 
political “power to ‘make’ live and ‘let’ die.” The state established a new technology of 
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power that no longer sought to regulate human bodies individually through an apparatus 
of “anatomo-politics,” but invented a biopolitical mechanism for the regulation of the 
entire human race. Biopower, or the technology of power acting through biopolitics, 
established a set of processes to regulate the existence, persistence, and reproduction 
of human life. Biopower produced knowledge through the standardization and 
normalization of human life, establishing universally applicable expectations of sexuality, 
health, and human relationships. Social and political stability demanded that a process 
of discipline be replaced by a process of regularization, in making live and letting die.19 
Sullivan’s work did not predict, but perhaps anticipated the underlying social and political 
normalization tendency that Foucault later assembled in his theory of biopower. 
Psychiatry, for Sullivan, necessarily involved the “study [of] the degrees and patterns of 
things which I assume to be ubiquitously human,” constrained by limits and absolutes.20 
For Sullivan, human beings were studied relationally, not individually, and always in 
reference to universal human norms and patterns of life. These norms regulated and 
constrained human beings through the social process of interpersonal relations. The 
psychiatric hospital was not an institution designed to discipline and punish individuals, 
but an institution and store of knowledge designed to reorient individuals to a set of 
mainstream human norms that regulated human society. Sullivan created an inclusive 
community in the hospital that provided a third space for patients, acknowledging the 
validity of their non-normative social position and supporting their transition back to a 
biopolitical, regularizing society. 
Queer theorists Elizabeth Grosz, in The Nick of Time:  Politics, Evolution, and the 
Untimely, and Dana Seitler, in Atavistic Tendencies:  The Culture of Science in American 
Modernity, argued that the advent of modernity was characterized by disruptive 
biological and temporal tendencies that established the present in relation to the past, 
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and the past as it continued to exist in the present. According to Grosz, the invention of 
biology – and the corporeality of human beings – as a system that engendered historical, 
social, cultural, and sexual differences made possible the ceaseless transformation of 
these constitutive factors in a self-stimulating historical process. Human life occupied a 
state of constant temporal becoming that theorized the endless, unexpected, and 
unrepeatable interruption of historical events across time and space. In a state of 
temporal becoming the past and anticipated future encroach on the present moment – 
the present is both the consequence of the past and cause of the future, incited by 
unpredictable ruptures and sudden changes. The process of temporal becoming might 
only be understood in the articulation of broad, population-wide tendencies that fail at the 
individual, human level of analysis. The present was neither entirely determined by nor 
fully independent from the past and future, but “the ground from which divergence and 
difference erupt.”21 For Seitler, knowledge of an identifiable present was made possible 
by a process of modern temporality that coincidentally severed the present from the past 
and necessitated the past’s return in the present. Modernity diverged from pre-modernity 
through the invention of a distinction between two historical moments, the then and the 
now, articulated through the mutually reinforcing human concepts of progress and loss. 
Knowledge of the present moment was made possible in establishing knowledge of the 
past, or knowledge of a past presence purportedly left behind in the present. Aspects of 
the past were subsumed in the present, and, as a result, remained liable to resurface 
through a process that Seitler theorized as atavism.22 Sullivan developed a similar 
schema for individual patients. Both his interviews with patients and his theory of the self 
grounded personified individuality in the confluence of historical, social, cultural, and 
biological inheritances and experiences in a patient. The sudden, irreconcilable 
disruption and forced reorganization of this previously stable pattern of factors 
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precipitated the onset of schizophrenia in a patient. Sullivan defined schizophrenia as 
“meaning literally a fragmentation of the mind,” or terror-inducing perceptions that were 
independent from reality and seemingly more powerful than the individual.23 A patient on 
Sullivan’s ward lived in a moment that was neither entirely determined by nor 
independent of the patient’s social milieu, their interpretation of past experiences, and 
their anticipated future relationships.24 When individuals or collective groups failed to 
successfully adapt to the social demands of the present, self-preservation required that 
they search for acceptable rationalizations to explain away these demands. 
Rationalizations were often rooted in the return of previously normalized ways of 
knowing, being, and living that may have spent years in relative dormancy.25  
Judith Butler, in Bodies that Matter and Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, in “Queer and 
Now,” developed two of the concepts of queer theory – performativity and gender 
relations – with the support of earlier work by British philosopher J.L. Austin and 
American sociologist Erving Goffman. Performativity and gender relations are concepts 
that interrogate the normalization of language, ideas, and behaviors through individuals 
and across a human population.26 For Butler, a subject constituted its personified form – 
and, concurrently, its gender – through the iteration of norms in a ritualized production 
that extended from the past to the future through the present. A subject was constituted 
by the interaction of subjects within gender relations and, in the process, constituted 
those relations into which it entered. Butler noted, “Subjected to gender, but 
subjectivated by gender, the ‘I’ neither precedes nor follows the process of this 
gendering, but emerges only within and as the matrix of gender relations themselves.”27 
Gender relations were both determined by and determined a subject that could only be 
known in gender relations that were necessarily constructed through the interaction of 
subjects. Sedgwick picked up from Austin in explaining that queer performativity is a 
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useful tool to interrogate “certain utterances that do not merely describe, but actually 
perform the actions they name.” The use of language to describe or articulate 
necessarily positioned the subject in relation to that which was being described or 
articulated, or the performance of a ritualized subject-position.28 J.L. Austin had 
developed the concept of performativity in the 1960s, arguing that there exists a cadre of 
utterances that do not simply describe or state an action, but in fact perform an action. 
Utterances that perform an action demanded shared, stable, and known – i.e., 
normalized – circumstances and an accurate iteration of the utterance that participants 
sought to perform.29 Austin emphasized the centrality of shared institutions, beliefs, and 
values to performance. Erving Goffman examined the sociological implications of the 
performance in The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life (1956) and performed gender 
roles in Gender Advertisements (1976).30 Louis Althusser identified a similar social 
phenomenon in the concept of interpellation, or the embodiment of ideologies in social 
and political institutions that constituted individual identity through social interactions.31 
Sullivan articulated a theory of interpersonal relations that is similar to that 
developed by Judith Butler at the end of the twentieth century. Sullivan’s theory emerged 
in the context of his clinical experience and the evidence that he accumulated on the 
widespread failure of individuals to successfully uphold the expectations around sex and 
sexuality demanded by American society. The realm of interpersonal relations theorized 
a shared social space in which any two or more human organisms – real or imagined – 
interacted. An individual sense of selfhood was both necessary and the result of 
engagement with others through interpersonal relations. Individuals established a 
personality, or unique sense of self, through interrelations with others. The self was only 
possible within a complex of interpersonal relations and served as the node through 
which an individual entered these relations.32 The process of interpersonal relations 
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often required the repetition of or conformity to a set of shared, underlying expectations 
and resonated with later theories of gender and sexuality as performative. According to 
Sullivan, human behaviors were normalized through tendency systems that were upheld 
by social, cultural, and religious institutions. Tendency systems involved a broad 
spectrum of ritualized factors that established positionality, maintained social stability, 
and created a shared basis of self formation. An individual might attempt to perform 
markers of the tendency system – iterating a word, an image, or a belief – as a 
declaration and an act of conformity.33 Sullivan’s theory of interpersonal relations and the 
tendency system that structured its emergence appeared on the surface to gesture 
toward the innovative reorientation of philosophical preoccupation under the banner of 
queer theory in the second half of the twentieth century. 
Queer theorists created new words and ideas to address a rapidly changing 
society in the second half of the twentieth century. There is a strong argument to be 
made that the affinity between many of Sullivan’s novel ideas and the central concepts 
of later queer theory identifies Sullivan as an early example of the desire to understand 
individuality in a society that rendered the individual essentially queer; however, that is 
not my intention here. Many of Sullivan’s individual contributions to psychiatry and the 
social sciences appear to anticipate this sea change in American social and political 
thought during the second half of the twentieth century, but simply portraying Sullivan as 
an early prognosticator of late-twentieth century queer theory risks diminishing the 
historical importance of the dynamic, interdisciplinary conversations around self and 
society to which he contributed in his historical moment. Sullivan accumulated a vast 
store of potentially useful ideas and metaphors from great thinkers of the past and his 
present, recast these ideas in a mold of his own creation, and contributed a wholly 
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unique perspective of who and what an individual should be in an uncertain and ever-
changing American society through the language of psychiatric medicine.  
The ideas that Sullivan articulated were also decidedly a product of the 
conditions that shaped the society in which he lived. Writing in the 1930s and 1940s, 
Sullivan could not possibly have anticipated the transformative social, legal, and political 
changes that inspired the development of queer theory in the decades after his death, 
nor could he have foreseen the wealth of intellectual applications that queer theory has 
generated on its own behalf. Sullivan did, however, witness firsthand the psychological 
consequences of prejudice and recognized the potential of his contributions to 
continuing discussions of self and society in the postwar era. The inclusion of American 
intellectuals from disparate disciplines in postwar conversations reveals a vibrant 
process of intellectual activity that connects these epochal ideas with the philosophical 
preoccupations of the present moment.  
American intellectuals have a tendency to articulate new ‘philosophical’ ideas 
through a variety of disciplinary vocabularies and methods.  Utilitarian philosopher John 
Stuart Mill once argued that “all students of man and society who possess that first 
requisite for so difficult a study, a due sense of its difficulties, are aware that the 
besetting danger is not so much of embracing falsehood for truth, as of mistaking part of 
the truth for the whole.”34 Looking for American intellectual engagement exclusively in 
privileged academic spaces necessarily overlooks the individuals who forever changed 
the conversations occurring within the very institutions from which their voices were 
excluded.35 Intellectual production in established academic disciplines is just one part of 
a far larger story of ideas. Sullivan never earned a Bachelor’s degree, did not complete 
formal training in philosophy, and he received only limited support from mainstream 
academic institutions in his career. His central ideas remained largely unassembled 
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throughout his life, transmitted informally through psychiatry articles, hospital lectures, 
and ad hoc intellectual collaboration. Yet, historical evidence reveals the depth of 
Sullivan’s participation in conversations at the heart of the twentieth century’s most 
enduring intellectual preoccupation:  reimagining selfhood in a radically transformed 
American society. I argue that including Sullivan – and other overlooked thinkers – within 
an intellectual history of the United States demonstrates the experimentation that 
foreshadowed many of the foundational postwar changes to mainstream thought and 
identity.36 Sullivan’s life and ideas highlight the wealth of thought produced in the United 
States in the 1930s and 40s, the influence of ideas produced in disciplines that were not 
expressly philosophical, and the remarkable diversity of personal backgrounds from 
which individuals who were excluded from white, mainstream society hypothesized 
changes to its underlying structure.  
I. Harry Stack Sullivan’s Life and Work 
This section examines the influence of Sullivan’s personal background and 
experiences on his later work. Sullivan’s unique life circumstances and academic 
training in the field of psychiatry combined to shape his ideas and the methods he used 
to share those ideas with others. I argue that this combination of training and personal 
background has contributed to his current disregard in intellectual history. His 
engagement with controversial neo-Freudian figures37 and the cooptation of his cardinal 
ideas by a radical, violent cult of “Sullivanians” that operated in New York City from the 
1950s through the mid-1980s may partially explain the relative dearth of historical 
literature on Sullivan.38 However, these professional associations and the cooptation of 
his legacy will not be examined in this section. Sullivan should not be held responsible 
for the ideas of his colleagues or the frequent misapplication of his ideas following his 
death.  
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Harry Stack Sullivan was born to a family of Irish-Catholic farmers in rural 
Norwich, New York in 1892. He attended Cornell University on scholarship but left prior 
to earning his Bachelor’s degree. He entered the Chicago College of Medicine and 
Surgery without an undergraduate diploma, graduating with a medical degree in 
psychiatry in 1917. Sullivan started his career in 1919 at St. Elizabeth’s Hospital in 
Washington, D.C. before moving to Sheppard and Enoch Pratt Hospital in Towson, MD 
(1923-1930), serving as the institution’s research director after 1925. Sullivan left 
medical practice in 1930 to pursue a career as an intellectual in New York City. He 
founded the William Alanson White Psychiatric Foundation, academic journal Psychiatry, 
and helped establish the Washington School of Psychiatry. After World War II, Sullivan 
worked extensively with UNESCO and helped to establish the World Federation for 
Mental Health. He died in Paris on January 14, 1949 after attending a meeting of the 
Federation.39 Sullivan participated in countless interdisciplinary conversations throughout 
his life that diffused his ideas well beyond psychiatry.40  
The content and direction of Sullivan’s intellectual activity is indelibly marked by 
the trajectory of his life, beginning with his childhood in rural Chenango County, New 
York. Tucked away in the Susquehanna River Valley of Upstate New York, Chenango 
was founded in the final decades of the eighteenth century by people of traditional 
Puritan, New England stock and with the pride that accompanied a thriving economy in 
agricultural products and small crafts. The succeeding decades found Chenango 
consistently shut out of economic progress, missing a connection to the Erie Canal forty 
miles to the south and by fifty miles to the north a link to New York City with the 
expansion of the Erie Railroad to Binghamton.41 Chenango’s resulting insulation left its 
residents particularly vulnerable to economic depression in the waning decades of the 
nineteenth century – including the social, political, and personal struggles that often 
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accompanied economic decline. Two years after Sullivan’s birth, the Panic of 1893 and 
subsequent depression hit his parents especially hard. In the course of a single year, 
Sullivan’s father Timothy lost his job as an unskilled laborer at a hammer company in 
Norwich, and his mother Ella experienced a mental health crisis that rendered her 
incapable of continuing life with her husband and young son. Ella Stack’s proud Irish 
yeoman-class family had never approved of her marriage to the working-class Timothy. 
The family unilaterally negotiated the terms of the family’s reunification, which forced 
Timothy to sell their humble home in the Irish part of town and move himself and the 
baby to become caretaker on the Stack family farm in Smyrna.42 The family rarely 
discussed this chapter in Ella’s life openly with Harry after her return. However, the kind 
of mental health crisis that Ella Stack experienced was common during Sullivan’s 
childhood amid the economic devastation in Chenango County.  
Lingering reverberations from the Economic Panic of 1901 and impending Panic 
of 1907, or the Knickerbocker Crisis, generated economic stagnation in rural upstate 
New York and flurry of depression, murder, and suicide across Chenango County. The 
region was propelled to national notoriety in 1906 after the tragic murder of County 
resident Grace Brown, an event that Theodore Dreiser later fictionalized in An American 
Tragedy (1925).43 In 1906, Grace Brown and Chester Gillette traveled by train to Big 
Moose, New York in the Adirondack Mountains. Brown was discovered at the bottom of 
the lake with several abrasions on her head. Gillette was promptly arrested on charges 
of murder.44 Following a lengthy trial that was closely reported by America’s widest 
reaching newspapers, Gillette was sentenced to die by electric chair.45 The American 
reading public was captivated by the appalling circumstances of Brown’s death and the 
dramatic human relationships at the trial’s center. For the adolescent Sullivan, this 
particular news story represented more than the sensationalized murder of a young 
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woman in America’s yellow presses. Sullivan’s early sexual attractions did not conform 
to the accepted norms of Chenango County and overlapped with the events preceding 
Brown’s murder.  
Brown was born and raised on a farm near Ostelic, Chenango County; likely no 
more than ten miles from fourteen year-old Harry’s home on the Stack family farm in 
neighboring Smyrna.46 Brown left her poor, farming family in Ostelic to move to 
Courtland, New York in search of additional social and economic opportunities.47 She 
first me Gillette while working in his uncle’s skirt factory. Newspaper accounts cast 
Brown as the epitome of the hardworking, Christian moral simplicity of yeoman farmers 
and Gillette an example of the aristocratic values of American’s new upper class elites.48 
These newspaper accounts overlooked the psychologically debilitating influence these 
rigid rural values exerted over Brown in the weeks preceding her murder. An autopsy 
following her death showed that she was several months pregnant, giving Brown few 
options in a county that upheld strict norms of sexual behavior.49 Brown was ostracized 
by those that she had known for her entire life, an ‘otherness’ that Chenango enforced 
upon any individual deemed racially, religiously, ethnically, or sexually different. Brown 
desperately penned, “I was down at the village Friday morning, and I would speak to 
people, and instead of speaking they would stare and then tell me I was too pale to be 
out of bed.” 50 The residents of Chenango County lacked any tools for addressing, let 
alone accepting, Brown’s unique sexual circumstances. Existing social patterns 
essentially rendered Brown invisible in plain sight. The adolescent Sullivan, an engaged 
fourteen-year-old when Brown was murdered, may have started to recognize that his 
sexual desires placed him outside the bounds of Chenango’s social values and 
compounded the isolation that he experienced as a consequence of his ethnicity, 
religion, and economic status.  
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While Grace Brown’s murder is the most vivid example, sensational stories of 
murder and suicide from various corners of the County were standard fare in the pages 
of the Norwich Sun, the region’s most widely circulated newspaper.51 Traumas reported 
in the Norwich Sun and made into local lore called into question the ways in which area 
residents understood class, gender, sexuality, religion, and mental illness during the first 
decade of the twentieth century. Chenango’s prejudicial norms shaped Sullivan’s early 
sense of himself and his world.52 Sullivan reflected on his early exposure to prejudice, 
writing “In my own early years, by a series of irrelevant accidents, I heard things said 
about Jews, but I didn’t know any Jews. Because of an extremely fortunate accident of 
what seemed to be otherwise a very unpleasant developmental history, I did not have 
very much interest in these vague rumors that I’d never seen exemplified, and so I did 
not adopt this stereotype.”53 He likely also heard many things said about Irish-Catholics. 
Equally important, however, was the sense of loneliness and isolation that Sullivan 
personally felt from his earliest childhood through leaving home on a scholarship to 
Cornell University and across the remainder of his professional and personal life. 
Eulogizing Sullivan at his funeral, psychiatrist Dr. Clara Thompson told mourners 
that “Harry Stack Sullivan was a lonely person from his earliest childhood.” As a young 
child, Sullivan befriended the livestock on his family’s farm to abate his loneliness.54 
According to Sullivan’s biographer Helen Swick Perry, until he began attending the 
village school in Smyrna at the age of five his childhood contact with other people was 
largely “limited to relatives who were still not assimilated into the old Yankee society of 
Chenango County.” Only occasional visits from his Aunt Margaret relieved Sullivan’s 
childhood loneliness. A school teacher at PS 164 in Brooklyn, Aunt Margaret fostered 
Harry’s love of the written word and sparked his curiosity about the more distant world.55 
Unfortunately, he remained the only Irish-Catholic boy in the Symrna school system from 
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the day he first stepped inside a classroom until he graduated, leaving him nearly as 
lonely and alienated at school as on the farm.56  
The specter of loneliness accompanied Sullivan to Cornell University, where he 
studied on scholarship. Sullivan revisited this period in a series of unpublished writings 
that were assembled posthumously as Interpersonal Theory of Psychiatry. Loneliness, 
argued Sullivan, should be considered a “quintessential force” in life so great as to defy 
description. “A lonely child has a natural bent toward social isolation.” In time, it “makes 
people around you not so much enemies as unpredictable sources of humiliation, 
anxiety, and punishment with respect to what you communicate; and that naturally tends 
to reduce the freedom and enthusiasm of your communication.”57 Sullivan’s lonely 
existence, the cause and consequence of his consistent inability to properly orient his 
personality to his situation, profoundly influenced his disposition and affiliations in his 
later life. Perry, using a method like Sullivan’s own, identified a pattern in Sullivan’s 
efforts at belonging:  “he would usually be more comfortable with those who had had the 
experience of not belonging – with patients, with the uneducated, with women – than 
with those who were the successful ones.”58 Sullivan’s self-identification with the lonely 
ones, inflected by his own experiences of alienation and marginalization, influenced his 
later theories. 
 The Sullivan family’s Irish-Catholic heritage placed Harry firmly on the outside of 
mainstream society in rural, upstate New York. Noel Ignatiev and others have 
demonstrated that Irish-Americans were racialized subjects in the United States during 
the second half of the nineteenth century.59 Sullivan experienced racial prejudice from 
his earliest childhood. The 1907 economic and social collapse in Chenango County 
elicited a virulent strain of nativism that was often directed toward the Sullivan family, 
one of only a handful of Irish-Catholic families in the region. This nativism resurfaced 
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with startling virulence the day after Ella Stack’s funeral in 1926 when he was 34 years 
old. On March 17, the Ku Klux Klan celebrated St. Patrick’s Day and the departure of the 
countless Irish Catholic mourners who attended Ella’s funeral by burning two, large 
crosses on a hill overlooking the train depot. Sullivan had already left Smyrna after the 
funeral and did not witness the event. However, the hill upon which the “celebration” was 
staged could be seen from the living room of the Stack family farmhouse that his father – 
the last Irish-Catholic left in Symrna – still maintained. News of this event undoubtedly 
reached Harry, a final affront from the town that shunned him all his life.60 
 Sullivan left for Cornell to study physics after graduating from Smyrna High 
School in 1908. Only one year into his studies in Ithaca, Sullivan experienced an onset 
of anxiety and corresponding schizophrenic break that his biographer attributes to peer-
group bullying and his chronic failure to attain a sense of belonging among his fellow 
students. Little information exists on the exact circumstances of Sullivan’s departure or 
his treatment, though evidence suggests that he spent a period of time under the care of 
Thurston Packer and A. A. Brill – the first to translate Sigmund Freud into English – in 
the psychiatric ward of Bellevue Hospital in New York City.61 This mental health crisis 
inspired him to become a psychiatrist, and he subsequently enrolled at The Chicago 
College of Medicine in 1911 – a medical program for which an undergraduate degree 
was not required.62 Sullivan completed his medical degree in 1917 and arrived at the 
District of Columbia’s famous mental institution St. Elizabeth’s Hospital in 1919. There 
he came under the tutelage of William Alanson White at a moment of peak influence in 
White’s career.63 His mentor’s work at the intersection of society and psychiatric 
methodology established a blueprint for Sullivan’s succeeding clinical career at 
Sheppard and Enoch Pratt Hospital in Towson, Maryland and formed the intellectual 
foundation for future elaborations in his social thought. 
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Sullivan achieved his greatest clinical influence during an eight-year tenure at 
Sheppard and Enoch Pratt Hospital starting in 1922.64 He enjoyed an unprecedented 
degree of autonomy that he leveraged in redesigning the hospital to include a small 
psychiatric ward reserved for male schizophrenic patients, staffed by carefully selected 
male attendants, and fully equipped with recording equipment for ongoing research 
projects.65 Michael Stuart Allen demonstrated in a 2000 article published in The Gay & 
Lesbian Review that nearly all of the ward attendants were homosexual men personally 
selected and trained by Sullivan to work with the schizophrenic patients on the ward who 
themselves were nearly all gay. Allen quoted Arthur Linton, a nurse who started at 
Sheppard and Enoch Pratt in 1929, noting that “all of his patients were young male 
homosexuals. The attendants were of the same background, homosexuals who were 
potentially schizophrenic. The reason was therapeutic. The patients could hug, embrace, 
and kiss the attendants without feeling rejected, odd, embarrassed or humiliated.”66 The 
atmosphere on Sullivan’s wing at Sheppard and Enoch Pratt that Linton described was 
consistent with an institutional approach that Dr. Mary White described as “‘milieu 
therapy,’ in which the hospital administration and entire staff are utilized in the therapy of 
schizophrenic patients.” Sullivan recognized that the clinical environment was an 
extension of the patient’s social environment and that clinical treatment was part of the 
lived experience of patients – a factor that became part of the patient’s self-
understanding. Sullivan argued in an initially unpublished tract discovered by White that 
the concept of the psychiatrist as a participant observer demanded that “The therapist 
has an inescapable involvement in all that goes on in the interview; and to the extent that 
he is unconscious or unwitting of his participation in the interview, to that extent he does 
not know what is happening.”67 The therapist, attendants, staff, fellow patients, and 
hospital design were integral to the patient’s understanding of themselves and their 
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society. Treating a schizophrenic patient in accordance with Sullivan’s institutional model 
necessitated that the hospital provide an antidote to the loneliness and eviscerated 
sense of self that accompanied a long period of social marginalization. The hospital 
provided an inclusive community that these patients failed to discover elsewhere in 
society. 
Historian Naoko Wake, in Private Practices:  Harry Stack Sullivan, the Science of 
Homosexuality, and American Liberalism, argues that Sullivan’s clinical work must be 
read in the context of a prevailing interwar liberalism that led scientists to treat the public 
and the private as separate spaces. While Sullivan created an inclusive community in 
the privacy of his personal life and hospital ward that did not treat homosexuality as a 
problem in itself, he publicly upheld a medical definition that classified homosexuality as 
a disease. This scientific liberalism, argues Wake, limited the potential power of his 
ideas in advocating for broader social and political changes around sexuality.68 Sullivan’s 
clinical philosophy focused instead on providing an inclusive environment that nurtured a 
patient’s understanding of themselves and their worth as human beings. Dr. Phillip 
Wagner, who was trained in Sullivan’s institutional model, argued in 1952 that “His 
position is underscored by the remarks our patients sometimes make when they refer to 
the gains from the analytic experience:  ‘I feel as if I have found my self-esteem,’ or ‘I am 
better able to accept myself – and others.’” The ward at Sheppard and Enoch Pratt did 
not have a system of treatment because, according to Wagner’s training, “A system of 
therapy tends to stifle research, ingenuity, intuition. It can become therapy by 
imitation.”69 Each patient was treated distinctively and each therapist was encouraged to 
develop a method of interaction that best fostered the patient’s cultivation of a positive 
sense of self and place in the world.  
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For Sullivan, sexuality was an important but secondary factor in eradicating 
loneliness. In an unpublished note, Sullivan argued that “Therapists should avoid 
galloping into the enormous forest of sexual preoccupations with schizophrenics; it is so 
much more important that a great deal be done about the business of loneliness.”70 The 
pragmatic institutional redesign of Sheppard and Enoch Pratt enabled Sullivan to 
cultivate an environment attuned to the social, cultural, and sexual factors that were 
essential to establishing a stable sense of self in society. In providing a clinical 
alternative to debilitating loneliness, Sullivan designed a safe and accepting place for 
homosexual patients otherwise cast to the margins of American society. 
Sullivan’s intellectual preoccupations extended beyond the institutional design of 
psychiatric hospitals to include the scientific methodology that both guided clinical 
intervention with patients and made possible the accumulation of observational evidence 
to support his ideas. The credibility of psychiatry as a scientific discipline, argued 
Sullivan, demanded the articulation of new knowledge rooted in evidence that held true 
even for different attending physicians and patients. Sullivan rejected many of the ideas 
articulated by Sigmund Freud and other psychoanalysts that could not be consistently 
reproduced in the clinical setting. Writing in Psychiatric Quarterly after addressing the 
Neurone Club in 1927, Sullivan argued that the “plausibility of application to facts of 
observation already at hand is not a scientific sanction if the hypothesis cannot be 
tested.” Drawing inspiration from the rigorous methodology advanced by other scientific 
disciplines, Sullivan attempted to render subjective human experience scientific through 
systemic data collection techniques.71 Sullivan observed numerous psychiatrists whose 
“data are wholly subjective or so tainted with his preconceptions as to be useless. 
Behind this situation, all the fundamental questions which bear on his data have been 
ignored or begged.”72 However, consistent observational methods did not imply the need 
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for a shared or uniform definition against which patients could be measured. Writing 
against the ‘averaging’ tendency in the social sciences, Sullivan argued that “it is 
preposterous, however, to imagine that the individual in the depths of schizophrenic 
processes is to be understood by a reference to an ‘average’ individual of corresponding 
chronologic age or the like.”73 Standardizing shared methods for collecting psychiatric 
data and rejecting uniform or averaged human experiences provided Sullivan a body of 
data relevant well beyond the scope of clinical psychiatry. Sullivan explained his 
methods in a lecture entitled “Schizophrenic Individuals as a Source of Data for 
Comparative Investigation of Personality” at a 1930 interdisciplinary social sciences 
conference devoted to the study of personality.74 He stated that “my attempts at 
collecting data on personality take the form of living with schizophrenic individuals.”75 
Sullivan developed a systematized methodological approach that advanced psychiatry 
as a scientific discipline, accumulated data with broad implications outside psychiatry, 
and contained hints of the social theory that would emerge after his move to New York 
City in 1930.  
In New York, Sullivan found unprecedented opportunities for intellectual and 
personal fulfillment. New York City stood at the center of radical intellectualism in the 
1930s United States, home to many of America’s most prominent Neo-Freudian 
psychiatrists; Leftist social activists;76 revolutionary social scientists Harold Lasswell and 
Edward Sapir at nearby Yale University; and Margaret Mead, Ruth Benedict and Franz 
Boas in the emerging field of cultural anthropology at Columbia University.77 Almost 
immediately after arriving in New York City, Sullivan began hosting a weekly gathering of 
friends and colleagues over dinner and drinks at a speakeasy.78 Sullivan named the 
gathering a meeting of the “Zodiac group” and required each of its members – among 
them, Karen Horney, Erich Fromm, Clara Thompson, and other guests or infrequent 
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attendees – to select an appropriate animal as his or her symbol.79 The group 
established a unique blend of social and theoretical conversations that shaped Sullivan’s 
later ideas and in turn enabled him to influence scholarship outside of his discipline. 
Sullivan’s biographer Helen Swick Perry noted that each member of the group 
maintained independence of thought while contributing to the collective whole through 
their particular area of expertise:  
Thompson and Horney combined their knowledge of women patients, emergent 
from two different societies, and each seemed to benefit, as reflected in their 
writings; Fromm, the only social scientist in the group, supplied important 
perspectives on the political situation in Germany and its meaning for the 
psychological state of its citizens; Billy Silverberg, who had taken over Sullivan’s 
ward at Sheppard for a year after Sullivan left, could compare his findings with 
Sullivan’s earlier experience and could act as a bridge between the European 
psychoanalysts and their American colleagues; Sullivan brought to the group his 
ability to observe scientifically and to put into some sophisticated theoretical form 
what they were all talking about.80 
Each Monday evening, Sullivan served as moderator and therapist for these 
conversations that drew together many, often seemingly disparate, strands of life and 
ideas. Sullivan placed himself and his ideas at the intersection of disciplines, 
perspectives, and theories; an aptitude that also led him to develop intellectual 
friendships with anthropologists Edward Sapir and Ruth Benedict. 
 Sullivan and Sapir first met in the fall of 1926, shortly after a long illness led to 
the death of Sapir’s first wife. Sapir, then at the University of Chicago, reached out to 
Sullivan after encountering an article he had written. The pair met at Sullivan’s 
downtown Chicago hotel room when Sullivan attended a conference in the city. 
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Sullivan’s biographer related that during this first encounter “the two men had talked in 
an almost uninterrupted fashion for eight hours” before Sapir’s second wife, Jean, called 
to see why her husband was not yet home. “But Sapir did not return home immediately 
after the call; the two of them could not stop talking to each other.” That first meeting in 
Chicago was the start of a deep friendship between the pair that would last until Sapir’s 
death in 1939. Sullivan helped inspire Sapir’s increasing interest in the role of culture 
and personality in anthropology, while Sapir willingly shared an intellectual acumen, the 
credibility of formal training in an academic discipline, and a collaborative spirit that 
inspired Sullivan’s emerging sense of intellectual self-assurance and his arguments on 
the illusory character of individual personality. Perhaps most importantly, Sullivan and 
Sapir shared the experience of growing up at the margins of American society. These 
experiences led both thinkers to search for what Perry calls “the idea of the essential 
similarity of people, beneath the veneer of ethnicity or social class” that might serve as 
the basis for discovering shared human understanding.81 In November 1929, Sullivan 
and Sapir served together on a panel examining schizophrenic individuals as a source of 
data in the study of personality at the Second Colloquium on Personality Investigation. 
Sullivan argued that data collected through clinical treatment possessed far-reaching 
value, for “in this simplified situation we see manifestations of the subject matter of each 
of the social sciences.” Sapir was asked to elaborate on potential connections between 
Sullivan’s presentation and the field of anthropology, to which he noted that in both 
American society and the ‘primitive’ societies traditionally under the purview of 
anthropology “it is a question of one’s preferential pattern of expression or behavior 
fitting in or not fitting in so well into the socially transmitted patterns of behavior.”82 Sapir 
acknowledged Sullivan’s role in expanding anthropology beyond language and primitive 
customs. Writing only a few years before his death, Sapir noted “The conceptual 
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reconciliation of the life of society with the life of the individual can never come from an 
indulgence in metaphors. It will come from the ultimate implications of Dr. Sullivan’s 
‘interpersonal relations.’” He continued, “We should also be moving forward to a realistic 
instead of metaphorical definition of what is meant by culture and society.”83 The 
relationship between Sullivan and Sapir provided the pair with personal fulfillment and 
expanded the tools available to each thinker in articulating new perspectives on the self 
and society. 
 The kinship between Sullivan and anthropologist Ruth Benedict was a story of 
similarity and profound difference that began with two distinctive – albeit equally lonely – 
childhoods in Chenango County, New York. Both were lonely, but Benedict came from a 
Protestant, upper-middle class background.84 Helen Swick Perry noted that,  
For both Ruth Benedict and Harry Stack Sullivan, Chenango County, with its 
precise but conflicting value systems, spurred them on to find answers in the 
larger world:  Benedict seeking value systems of other societies as a way of 
understanding the incoherencies in her early family and community environment; 
Sullivan searching for the relation between outworn value systems and the 
sickness that infected gifted adolescents in the delicate transition from the early 
environment to the larger world.85 
Benedict’s quest for answers in the larger world led her first to undergraduate study at 
Vassar College before enrolling in an anthropology PhD program at Columbia University 
under Franz Boas. Following the completion of her dissertation in 1923, Benedict joined 
the faculty at Columbia and remained associated with the university until her death in 
1948.86 In spite of their vastly different experiences, disciplines, and career trajectories, 
Sullivan and Benedict’s interests overlapped again at the 1948 UNESCO conference in 
Podĕbrady, Czechoslovakia during the final year of their lives. Sullivan arrived in 
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Podĕbrady as a member of an international panel of social scientists interested in “the 
causes of tensions which make for war” and as an informal participant at a conference 
on “Childhood Education” at which Benedict was a featured speaker. The seminar was 
part of an ongoing series of discussions on the psychological development of children 
and education in a global society.87 Benedict’s lifelong interests in anthropology, 
education, and psychology made her a natural selection for the conference. Only a few 
years earlier, at a 1944 meeting of the American Psychiatric Association, anthropologist 
Clyde Kluckhohn credited Ruth Benedict, along with Margaret Mead and Edward Sapir, 
with integrating the tools available in psychiatry into a program for the advancement of 
anthropological thought.88 Benedict, Mead, and Sapir cultivated an anthropological 
method that demanded the orientation of scholarship around the subject as a whole 
person, a total personality, and located the individual as an active participant in a larger, 
dynamic social environment. Many of Benedict’s signal contributions to anthropology as 
a discipline were undoubtedly influenced by the ideas and methods that she acquired in 
her relationship with Sullivan. And Sullivan’s theories of self and society were profoundly 
influenced by Benedict’s investigative approach to the cultural continuities and 
discontinuities that existed between childhood and adulthood.89 Sullivan’s admiration for 
Benedict led him to write her obituary for the journal he started years earlier, Psychiatry, 
concluding that “Ruth Benedict had come to be at home in the world.”90 
Perhaps just as important as the intellectual relationships that blossomed during 
this period, Sullivan experienced a largely stable domestic life for the very first time with 
his lifelong partner, James “Jimmie” Inscoe. Sullivan’s work with queer patients and 
experiences as a gay man shaped his intellectual activity and social thought. Sullivan’s 
sexuality – including his domestic partnership with Inscoe – was rarely discussed openly 
during his life or after his death. Perry, Sullivan’s secretary and biographer, noted that 
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Sullivan’s childhood friend Clarence Bellinger often referred to him as “a homosexual 
and a son-of-a-bitch” after a falling out between them. However, in discussing Sullivan’s 
sexuality, Perry only went so far as to note that friends and colleagues acknowledged 
that Sullivan “had some sexual experiences with women as well as with men. But there 
is no ready label for how he lived and thought and yearned.” 91 Seeking clarity on 
Sullivan’s sexuality, psychologist Michael Stuart Allen interviewed one of his former 
students, Dr. Benjamin Weininger, who “stated flatly that he and Sullivan had had sex-- 
twice, in 1937 or maybe in '39. Both encounters were after a few drinks at Sullivan's New 
York home on East 64th Street, when Weininger was a psychiatrist-in-training and 
Sullivan was his supervisor.” Beyond connecting with several interviewees willing to 
share Sullivan’s experiences, Allen struggled to find more than a rogue photo or letter to 
friends signed by both Harry and Jimmie.92 Why the dearth of historical evidence? 
According to Naoko Wake, Inscoe “reported that he had burned Sullivan’s personal 
letters soon after Sullivan died in 1949, to protect his deceased partner’s reputation. 
Inscoe believed that Sullivan had ‘experienced hostility from a great many people’ 
throughout his life; hence he must be defended against ‘nasty rumor’ that might rise out 
of releasing any aspects of his personal life.”93 For as little as we know about his 
personal life, Inscoe’s comments reveal a tension between Sullivan’s sexuality and the 
values of his society. Sullivan’s personal background and life experiences left him 
consistently outside of the bounds of white, mainstream American society. His place as 
a relative outsider led him to develop unique solutions to a continuous tension of the self 
in-and-out of step with society that extended from the classical liberal tradition to the 
pragmatist school of thought in the late nineteenth century and the sociological 
revolution of the first half of the twentieth century. 
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II. Ongoing Conversation on Self and Society 
 If we are to truly appreciate Sullivan’s contributions as an innovative and 
overlooked thinker, we must first locate his position in a common conversation on the 
self and society in the intellectual history of the United States. This section explores the 
wider context of Sullivan’s participation in this conversation. It will first consider a theory 
of ‘possessive individualism’ in classical liberal political thought before examining the 
pragmatism of William James, John Dewey, and Wilhelm Dilthey. Next, it will entertain 
George Herbert Mead and Charles Horton Cooley’s symbolic interactionism, and the 
sociology of European thinkers Max Weber and Emile Durkheim. It will then consider 
Talcott Parsons’ reading of Weber and Durkheim, in addition to the work of Austrian-
American phenomenologist Alfred Schütz. The affinities and antipathies among these 
thinkers, disciplines, and epochs profoundly shaped the conversation around selfhood 
and society that Sullivan entered in the 1930s and 40s. This conversation both enabled 
and constrained Sullivan’s intellectual contributions. Sullivan advanced, challenged, and 
reimagined these established notions of self and society through a framework guided by 
his experienced marginalization and the social evidence that he accumulated in clinical 
observation.  
 The classical liberal tradition in political thought, dating back to Thomas Hobbes 
in 1651,94 was constructed through an essential category of selfhood that political 
theorist C.B. Macpherson articulated as a theory of “possessive individualism.”95 
According to Macpherson, modern individualism was founded on a faith in the individual 
as a sole proprietor of the characteristics and attributes that created and maintained a 
sense of self. The individual right to absolute ownership of the self was endowed in an 
ahistorical condition – by God or by Nature – and could not be alienated or abridged by 
the state, society, or coexistent individuals. Differences in human characteristics 
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remained irreconcilable in the social state because they could not be evaluated 
independent of the individual selves in which they existed. Macpherson identified seven 
shared characteristics within Hobbes, Locke, and other thought critical to the United 
States’ founding texts and ideas. Possessive individualism entailed for the self freedom 
from dependence on the wills of others; freedom from any and all relations except those 
entered voluntarily and in one’s self-interest; absolute property unto one’s person and 
capacities, and absence of debt to society for the ownership of one’s person and 
capacities; the right to alienate one’s capacity to labor; knowledge of an a priori 
construction of human society as a series of market relations; individual freedom limited 
only by those obligations and rules considered absolutely necessary to secure and 
preserve equivalent freedom for others; and a political society oriented around the 
protection of individual property and maintenance of orderly exchange of the fruits of 
one’s property unto oneself. Macpherson argued that possessive individualism tenuously 
constructed selfhood through interdependent theories of obligation and morality, a 
marriage that was necessarily articulated as negative freedom.96 Traditional liberal 
political theory maintained that the individual self existed in a promise of preservation, or 
the promise of freedom from the changing influence – or norms – of social engagement 
and political dispositions. In transforming the epistemological certainty that preserved the 
possessive individualist self, William James, John Dewey, and the American pragmatists 
established a positive freedom to discover and reinvent the self to changing social, 
political, and intellectual conditions. 
Shifting intellectual preoccupations in the late nineteenth century stimulated the 
emergence of an innovative school of philosophical pragmatism that destabilized and 
replaced the epistemological certainty that characterized traditional liberal political theory 
with a shared process of determining relative truths through consensual validation in 
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social spaces. William James and John Dewey participated (in their own way) in an 
intellectual movement that subsumed the concepts of political liberalism within new 
language and logic of pragmatism. William James modified liberal political theory to 
include the accumulation of social, cultural, and political possessions as the self. James’ 
empirically conceived sense of self expanded the constitutive scope of the formation of 
individual identity but preserved the proprietorship that one had to oneself and one’s 
capacities as articulated in traditional liberal political thought. James wrote, “In its widest 
possible sense, however, a man’s Self is the sum total of all that he CAN call his, not 
only his body and his psychic powers, but his clothes and his house, his wife and his 
children, his ancestors and friends, his reputation and works, his lands and horses, and 
yacht and bank account. All these things give him the same emotions.”97 An individual 
continued to possess his or her body and those possessions generated in using that 
body to transform nature, but acquired additional ownership of psychological 
accumulations resulting from experiences. For James, knowledge included all that 
individuals perceived or experienced, such that “What these people experience is 
Reality.” There is nothing else. Hypotheses emerged from “the personal experience of 
those best qualified in our circle of knowledge to have experience, to tell us what is.” 
James’ logical emphasis on experience and perception provoked an epistemological 
revolution, transforming the stable and observable truths central to political liberalism 
into a malleable and ever-changing body of truths that coincided with the individual and 
collective experiences of human society. James argued that the only “test of probable 
truth is what works best in the way of leading us, what fits every part of life best and 
combines with the collectivity of experience’s demands, nothing being omitted.” 98 
That epistemological transformation of political liberalism in James’ thought, 
argued historian Andrew Jewett, also guided the contributions of pragmatist John 
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Dewey. Jewett noted, “Positivists believed it was possible to determine ahead of time 
where empirical inquiry would produce interpretive consensus and where it could never 
do so because of the intrinsic nature of the subject matter. Pragmatists, on the other 
hand, concluded just the opposite from the past successes of the sciences:  one could 
never presume to know in advance where consensus would or would not emerge.” 
Further, Jewett argued that James and Dewey “described all scientific truths as human 
creations – more or less reliable tools for navigating an ineffable external world.” The 
process of articulating truth and knowledge as the deliberate construction of human 
beings marked a radical epistemological departure from all preceding philosophical 
understanding. In acknowledging the constructed nature of current knowledge, 
pragmatism invented the possibility of refuting, altering, or establishing new knowledge 
through collective human experiences in the future. Dewey’s epistemological framework 
supported the assertion that knowledge was “valid only to the extent that it enabled the 
manipulation of reality in the interests of human beings.”99 Dewey’s pragmatism cast a 
pall of uncertainty on American political thought, coincidentally destabilizing the 
epistemological certainty that guided the liberal tradition and expanding opportunities for 
the creation of new knowledge in the future. 
According to historian James Kloppenberg, the contributions of James and 
Dewey were not limited to expanding the scope of possible knowledge and destabilizing 
epistemological certainty in liberal political theory. Rather, the pragmatists – 
Kloppenberg also included German philosopher Wilhelm Dilthey in this camp – entirely 
upended the prevailing faith in a dualistic construction of human life that had guided the 
philosophical enterprise since Descartes. “By lifting the veil imposed by dualism, Dewey, 
James, and Dilthey uncovered richly textured contours of experience that eluded British 
empiricism.” The pragmatists were relentless critics of the static nature and inherited 
32 
 
passivity of Lockean epistemology. The conceptualization of knowledge as inherent or 
found, they argued, ignored ceaseless historical change in the realm of human society, 
culture, and experience. The pragmatists argued that true “understanding involves 
recognition of the sociocultural dimensions of human experience.” The historicizing 
tendency of social and cultural factors in pragmatist philosophy was key to 
understanding the movement’s critique of Cartesian dualism embodied in liberal political 
thought. Kloppenberg noted, “All these thinkers contended that the historical quality of 
experience and knowledge placed the epistemology of theorists from Locke to Mill on 
very unsteady ground, and they linked the ahistorical quality of associationist psychology 
with the associationists’ failure to recognize the sociocultural and value-laden quality of 
experience.”100 The pragmatists identified the ways in which liberal political theory’s 
reliance on an ahistorical state of nature for the construction of self and society curtailed 
intellectuals’ ability to identity and respond to transformative changes across time and 
space. The logic of human experience in pragmatist thought integrated the individual, 
the totality of collective sociocultural forces and personal perception through a process 
of knowledge creation that connected the past, present, and future. James articulated 
the process: 
The most violent revolutions in an individual’s beliefs leave most of his old order 
standing. Time and space, cause and effect, nature and history, and one’s own 
biography remain untouched. New truth is always a go-between, a smoother-
over of transitions. It marries old opinion to new fact so as ever to show a 
minimum of jolt, a maximum of continuity. […] To a certain degree, therefore, 
everything here is plastic.101  
The pragmatists transformed the epistemological orientation of political liberalism and 
established a process of changing knowledge of selfhood and society over time. 
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Sociologists George Herbert Mead and Charles Horton Cooley continued the 
conversation around self and society in developing a theory of symbolic interactionism 
that adapted pragmatist epistemology to the behavior and interactions of individuals in 
human society. Mead and Cooley examined pragmatist notions of truth in the context of 
communication and language in the development of human behavior, social 
organization, and distinctive patterns of interaction. The centrality of a ‘primary group’ in 
Jamesian thought evolved in Cooley’s work into a theory of the intrinsically social nature 
of humankind. Knowledge of the self and society developed within a process of 
communicative action that created understanding and sympathy among and between 
individuals. A known, independent self emerged through the individual synthesis of 
disparate perspectives, or experiences, articulated as a form of communication within a 
process of socialization. Cooley maintained that the socialization process, including 
communication, was key to understanding the creation of communities and recognition 
of a distinctive or unique sense of self.102 According to Cooley, “Self and society go 
together, as phases of a common whole. I am aware of the social groups in which I live 
as immediately and authentically as I am aware of myself.” Cooley did not envision 
primary groups as static or culturally specific, but a universal form of social organization 
of indeterminate size. The socialization process existed in small, intimate primary groups 
that may include a nuclear family to the relatively impersonal, secondary and tertiary 
groups established through institutions in a liberal democratic society. For Cooley, 
“Primary groups are primary in the sense that they give the individual his earliest and 
completest experience of social unity, and also in the sense that they do not change in 
the same degree as more elaborate relations.” Consequently, “These groups, then, are 
springs of life, not only for the individual but for social institutions.”103 Cooley amended 
pragmatist epistemology to include the pervasive influence of culture and social norms in 
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the development of an individual sense of self. His theory on the development of social 
values articulated a process through which communication between individuals in a 
primary group established a shared understanding of normalized group behavior. Unique 
individuality was defined in relation to these norms in a process that was coincidentally a 
process of acculturation. 
 Mead remained largely ambivalent toward Cooley’s ideas. Mead advanced the 
pragmatist’s rejection of Cartesian duality in founding his structures of the ‘self’ and 
‘society’ on a foundation of the process of symbolic interaction. The self was not simply a 
projection of the mind’s perception onto the social environment, nor an object constituted 
through preexisting evidence in the material environment discerned by the mind, but a 
being that arose in awareness through communication and interaction in the social 
sphere.104 Mead acknowledged that “Cooley and James, it is true, endeavor to find the 
basis of the self in reflexive affective experiences.” However, “the theory that the nature 
of the self is to be found in such experiences does not account for the origin of the self, 
or of the self-feeling which is supposed to characterize such experiences.” Cooley and 
James rooted their theory of knowledge in the propensity of individuals to establish 
patterns within human experience without developing a theory of the individual that was 
necessarily present in each and every individual experience. Mead argued that a theory 
of pragmatism – and symbolic interactionism constructed in a pragmatist epistemology – 
demanded the creation of a normative theory of the self that was both objective and 
subjective, individual and social. The bipartite structure of selfhood that Mead developed 
united a subjective, individual “I” that experienced and an objective, social “me” that was 
narrated through past experience. Mead argued that “The ‘I’ is the response of the 
organism to the attitudes of the others; the ‘me’ is the organized set of attitudes of others 
which one himself assumes. The attitudes of others constitute the organized ‘me,’ and 
35 
 
then one reacts toward that as an ‘I.’” Further, “it is due to the individual’s ability to take 
the attitudes of these others in so far as they can be organized that he gets self-
consciousness.” An individual necessarily existed as a subjective “I” that felt and 
experienced. Yet, this individual only achieved awareness of their subjective existence in 
establishing a narrated form of the self as an objective “me” that was brought into 
existence through the organization of social relationships into discernable patterns. 
Mead’s sense of self was neither exclusively objective nor subjective, but the 
embodiment of a very real process that endowed it with social meaning and normative 
value. “Meaning is thus a development of something objectively there as a relation 
between certain phases of the social act; it is not a physical addition to that act and it is 
not an ‘idea’ as traditionally conceived.”105 Mead and Cooley amended pragmatist 
epistemology to include a theory of the self in social groups and a process for 
discovering a sense of self and meaning in American society. 
 European sociologists Emile Durkheim and Max Weber articulated theories of the 
self and society that emphasized the powerful influence of social institutions over 
individuals and the centrality of ideal types in the study of modernity.106 In Economy and 
Society (1922), Weber articulated a theory of social relations organized around the 
institutions of custom, convention, and law. Weber defined ‘custom’ as a widely 
accepted, typically uniform activity that persisted as a result of repetition or tradition; 
‘convention’ as a norm or custom that induced behavior entirely absent physical or 
psychological coercion; and ‘law’ as any coercive apparatus that enforced compliance to 
a given social norm. Weber considered each institution equally powerful in organizing 
human behavior, arguing that,   
Adherence to what has as such become customary is such a strong component 
of all conduct and, consequently, of all social action, that legal coercion, where it 
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transforms a custom into a legal obligation (by invocation of the ‘usual’) often 
adds practically nothing to its effectiveness, and, where it opposes custom, 
frequently fails in the attempt to influence actual conduct. Convention is equally 
effective, if not even more so.107 
Like Weber, Durkheim defined an institution as any form of organization established in a 
shared social space. Durkheim argued, “One can, indeed, without distorting the meaning 
of this expression, call institutions all the beliefs and modes of conduct instituted by the 
collectivity. Sociology can then be defined as the science of institutions, their genesis 
and functioning.” Institutions emerged as a product of human society, but did not 
necessarily depend on human will for their persistence. The persistence of an institution 
– or, an idea as an institution – in accordance with its own logic transformed the 
institution into a social fact. Durkheim continued,  
“If, once they come into being, ideas continue to exist independently, without 
being perpetually contingent upon the arrangement of neural centres, if they are 
capable of reacting directly upon each other and combining according to their 
own laws, then they are realities which, while maintaining a close relation with 
their substratum, are to a certain extent independent of it.”108  
The process of identifying social facts and institutions that act on and through individuals 
was central to empirical sociological investigation in Weber and Durkheim. 
Weber’s sociology depended on the concept of Ideal Types. He argued that 
“Theoretical differentiation (Kasuistik) is possible in sociology only in terms of ideal or 
pure types,” or as a series of “average types of an empirical statistical character, 
concepts which do not require methodological discussion.” Ideal Types were not a 
perfect depiction of reality, but simplifications made through empirical generalizations 
and in accordance to the social facts and institutions that necessarily conditioned 
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individual existence. Weberian Ideal Types framed his foundational study of the 
influence of religious institutions on the emergence of capitalist organization in The 
Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism.109 Durkheim preferred to generalize social 
processes through the invocation of categories of thought or ideas.110 Categories, for 
Durkheim, were stable and impersonal social facts with definite form and specific 
qualities that emerged as the product of social interaction. According to Durkheim, “It is 
because men were organized that they have been able to organize things, for in 
classifying these latter, they limited themselves to giving them places in the groups of 
which they were members.” Therefore, “the fundamental ideas of the mind, the essential 
categories of thought, are the product of social factors. We now see in fact, that this is 
the case with the very notion of ‘category’ itself.”111 Categories were useful as analytical 
generalizations of reality and could in fact become real in the same manner an idea and 
institution became a social fact. For Weber and Durkheim, institutions conditioned 
human existence and established the possibility of studying the ideals and categories 
that coincidentally emerged from and limited social existence. 
American-born sociologist Talcott Parsons and Austrian-American émigré 
phenomenologist Alfred Schütz entered the ongoing conversation around self and 
society in the twentieth century United States equipped with differing perspectives of a 
shared intellectual ancestry. Parsons propagated a school of sociology in the United 
States that he considered an offspring of the institutional – or structural – theories of Max 
Weber and Emile Durkheim. Schütz, on the other hand, sought answers to the 
unresolved epistemological tensions in Weberian sociology through a phenomenological 
method developed in relationship to the social sciences, empiricism, and American 
pragmatism.112 Parsons utilized an adapted form of Weberian institutional analysis to 
categorize experiences, culture, ideas, and relationships scientifically. In so doing, 
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Parsons established a theory of the self and society that condoned – if it did not outright 
encourage – the ordering of social norms and values. Historian John Gilkeson noted that 
Parsons “restricted the meaning of ‘culture’ to ‘values, ideas, and [symbols],’ while 
allowing the ‘social system’ (or ‘society’) to designate ‘interaction’ and ‘social action.’”113 
Parsons’ differentiation between culture and the social system represented a radical 
departure from Edward Sapir, Ruth Benedict, and anthropologists that had argued 
culture was part and parcel to the experience of social interactions. Andrew Jewett 
further noted that Parsons was a leading advocate of a perspectival approach that 
sought to integrate sociology with the study of culture and personality. As a result, 
“Parsons portrayed the normative core of a pluralistic, democratic society as an intricate 
hierarchy of values, differentiated toward the bottom but held together at the top by a few 
core commitments such as individualism and freedom.”114 Parsons argued that accepted 
schemas of scientific inquiry, including temporal-spatial frameworks and economic 
theories of supply and demand, produced knowledge far beyond that conceived through 
the experiential lens applied by pragmatism and symbolic interactionism. Writing in The 
Structure of Social Action, Parsons argued “When scientific observation begins to 
transcend common sense and becomes to a degree methodologically sophisticated, 
there emerge explicit schemata which may be called descriptive frames of reference.” 
These descriptive frames of reference were fundamental to the scientific enterprise, for 
“Facts cannot be described except within such a schema.”115 Parsons advanced a theory 
of self and society that acknowledged engagement with key theorists of the self but 
elevated sociological knowledge above the social experiences it studied and established 
the possibility of a hierarchical organization of society.116 
 Alfred Schütz attempted to philosophically reconcile the dichotomous objective-
subjective position in the social sciences from a phenomenological point of view. Schütz  
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accepted Weber’s methodological individualism, ideal types, and emphasis on social 
action as the primary concern of the social sciences. Scholar George Walsh summarized 
Schütz’s positon, “A social action is, therefore, an action which is oriented toward the 
past, present, or future behavior of another person or persons. The specific mode of 
orientation is its subjective meaning.” The social relationships between individuals – 
past, present, and future – both limited and made possible individual action. Yet, Schütz  
argued that the essential characteristics of ‘understanding,’ ‘subjective meaning,’ and 
‘action’ remained unresolved in Weber’s thought. According to Walsh, Schütz 
demonstrated that “a thoroughgoing philosophical investigation of the nature of action is 
essential to a coherent statement of the proper subject matter and methodology of the 
social sciences.”117 His search for the intellectual foundations of modern sociology led 
Schütz to articulate theories of self and society rooted in the meaning that emerged in 
experience. In a 1941 article, Schütz identified “certain essential starting points as well 
as principal views” held in common by pragmatist philosopher William James and 
phenomenologists Henri Bergson and Edmund Husserl. Schütz  joined James, Bergson, 
and Husserl in rejecting both the atomistic data of individuality that characterized liberal 
political thought and the Kantian concept of a transcendental ego. Schütz argued that 
there existed an essential unity of streaming cogitations in the personality, or “the 
incessant presence of two elements:  an objective person – the Empirical Self or Me – 
known by a passing subjective Thought – the I – and recognized as continuing in time.” 
Further, Schütz  adapted Husserl’s hypothesis on the reflective character of 
psychological experience, 
While just living along, we live in our experiences, and, concentrated as we are 
upon their objects, we do not have in view the “acts of subjective experience” 
themselves. In order to reveal these acts of experience as such we must modify 
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the naïve attitude in which we are oriented towards objects and we must turn 
ourselves, in a specific act of “reflection,” towards our own experiences.118 
The objective and subjective qualities of the self were reconciled in the capacity of the 
individual to reflect on and draw knowledge from their experiences. “Here and here only, 
in the deepest stratum of experience that is accessible to reflection, is to be found the 
ultimate source of the phenomena of meaning [Sinn] and understanding [Verstehen].”119 
Schütz articulated a theory of self and society that reintegrated the social distinctions 
that Parsons read in Weber and Durkheim’s sociological approach. The individual 
engaged experientially as both a subjective and objective self, and assigned meaning 
and developed understanding through the reflective act of locating the self in myriad 
social relationships. 
 Sullivan grappled with the ideas of the liberal political theorists, pragmatists 
James and Dewey, symbolic interactionists Mead and Cooley, sociologists Weber and 
Durkheim, and twentieth century sociologist Talcott Parsons and phenomenologist Alfred 
Schütz. His contributions to this conversation must be read as an act of writing back to 
these discussants, and their theories, ideas, methodologies and intentions.  
 Sullivan debated throughout his writings the ‘individual’ as conceived in liberal 
political theory. He frequently categorized this possessive form of absolute individuality 
as an ‘illusion’ or ‘illusory’ form of individuality in the United States. The widespread 
acceptance of liberal political theory, argued Sullivan, convinced Americans that they 
were entirely unique as individuals and were not dependent on society for the derivation 
of that individuality. According to Sullivan, “The most general category of these 
inhibitions of awareness is the overweening conviction of authentic individual selfhood 
which permeates all the implicit and explicit communicative efforts of nearly everyone. 
This amounts to a delusion of unique individuality, related to beliefs in one’s 
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omnipotence and omniscience, and is only a very complex and personally misleading 
expression of the real unique individuality.”120 Consequently, many Americans failed to 
recognize that they had constructed a sense of self on assumptions that were no longer 
functional.121 Sullivan joined the pragmatists in rejecting the duality of liberal individuality 
in favor of ways of knowing that were rooted in experience. Sullivan regularly cited the 
influence of Jamesian pragmatism on his emerging conceptions of knowledge and 
consensual validation in a shared social space.122 The concept of ‘truth’ was essentially 
social in character, the result of an interpersonal process. This process enabled 
individuals to establish knowledge and a sense of self through the identification of 
patterns in experiences. Sullivan’s reconciliation of the objective and subjective functions 
of the social self drew heavily on Mead and Cooley’s symbolic interactionism. He 
developed a theory of the bipartite self similar to that articulated by Mead in his theory of 
the subjective, individual “I” and the objective, social “me.”123 The similarity is not 
coincidental. Sullivan lectured at the Washington School of Psychiatry in 1946 and 1947, 
where he declared, “Under provocation of some very original thinking by Charles H. 
Cooley, George Herbert Mead, at the University of Chicago, developed a formula of 
social psychology which included the development of the self – not too far removed from 
what I discuss as the self-system – on the basis of reflected appraisals from others and 
the learning of roles which one undertook to live.”124 Sullivan shared with Cooley an 
emphasis on the pervasive influence of culture and social norms in the development of 
an individual sense of self and the organization of society through the primary group, or 
group of significant others.125 Knowledge was created in a shared social space that 
included individuals, culture, norms, and experiences.  
 Sullivan shared with sociologists Weber and Durkheim an interest in institutions. 
The normalized social patterns of behaviors and values that Sullivan argued influenced 
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individuals indexed a similar stable of social, political, cultural, and religious factors that 
Weber and Durkheim labeled institutions.126 Sullivan recognized that the process for 
identifying patterns in individual experience often led to generalized types, categories, 
and stages of human experience; however, he warned that personal insecurity may lead 
individuals to harden these patterns as stereotypes and prejudice. Categories in 
Sullivan’s thought were always of type and not of kind, the result of different experiences 
and not of essential qualities.127 An emphasis on the shared quality of humanity 
differentiated only through experience placed Sullivan’s ideas of personality far closer to 
those of Alfred Schütz than Talcott Parsons. Whereas Parsons viewed culture – values, 
ideas, and symbols – as an entity distinct from social relations, Sullivan understood the 
individual, culture, biology, and history as embodied in and inseparable from 
interpersonal relations. Sullivan refuted Parsons’ belief in the potential of science to 
transcend individual experience, for knowledge may only be created through the 
organization of experiences within a process of consensual validation.128 Schütz and 
Sullivan both emphasized the importance of experience as a reconciliation of the 
subjective and objective iterations of the self. Further, both argued that the past, present, 
and future connected in social relations – or social action – between and among 
individuals. Sullivan argued that new social patterns necessarily emerged from past 
patterns and were oriented toward an anticipated future.129 Competing methodological 
approaches in the study of personality during the twentieth century led Parsons to 
search for a scientific schema for objectively analyzing experience, while Sullivan and 
Schütz established a uniform process for understanding disparate human experiences. 
Sullivan’s participation in these ongoing conversations led him to develop novel 
conceptions of self and society that will be further explored in the next section. 
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III. Selfhood and Society in Harry Stack Sullivan 
As we have seen, Sullivan’s personal background and life experiences placed 
him firmly outside white, middle-class American society as a young person. His position 
as an outsider shaped the circumstances of his participation in an ongoing conversation 
on self and society that extended from the classical liberal tradition through pragmatism 
and the twentieth century social sciences. Having examined his life and intellectual 
inheritances, we may proceed to analyze the intricacies of the innovative political 
thought that Sullivan articulated through the language of psychiatry and leveraged in 
positing foundational changes to mainstream American society in the aftermath of war. 
Sullivan viewed the self as made in an endless iteration of processes within the 
realm of interpersonal relations, or the interrelation between any two or more human 
organisms – real or imagined – in a shared social space.130 Sullivan defined the field of 
psychiatry as “the study of processes that involve or go on between people [emphasis 
added]. The field of psychiatry is the field of interpersonal relations, under any and all 
circumstances in which these relations exist. It was seen that a personality can never be 
isolated from the complex of interpersonal relations in which the person lives and has his 
being.”131 The personality comprised a relatively stable and enduring pattern of 
biological, historical, cultural, and social characteristics manifest in a single organism 
that was formed in and could not be abstracted from the realm of interpersonal 
relations.132 In the 1931 issue of the American Journal of Psychiatry he argued that the 
study of the psychobiological character of the self was “a study of human persons in 
dynamic interrelation with other persons and with personal entities (culture, tradition, 
man-made institutions, laws, beliefs, fashions, etc.). To isolate its individual subject-
matter, a personality, from a complex of interpersonal relations involving most 
meaningfully other persons physically exterior to the subject-person, is preposterously 
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beside the point…”133 Sullivan rejected the existence of unique individuality and 
coinciding belief that a personality could be conceived independent of the processes of 
interpersonal relations. Sullivan wrote in Conceptions of Modern Psychiatry that he 
intended “to stress the central fact that the true or absolute individuality of a person is 
always beyond scientific grasp and invariably much less significant in the person’s living 
than he has been taught to believe.”134 The only form of individuality that could be 
ascribed to a human organism emerged through a dynamic, transformative process of 
interpersonal relations that was personified in an entity named the self.  
Sullivan’s self acquired personality differences through a shared process within 
the field of interpersonal relations. The process of establishing personality amplified 
human difference across history with the accumulation of different environments, 
inheritances, and experiences. All human individuals were united by “common motives, 
differentiated as to their manifestations by sole virtue of different experience.”135 The 
shared process of self-acquisition created individuals that were far more alike than 
otherwise. “All these individual differences are much less important than are the lack of 
differences, the similarities in the arts for instance, the parallels in the manifestation of 
human life wherever it is found.”136 But Sullivan’s emphasis on a universal human 
process of transforming the self – or manifesting life – created the possibility of an ever-
widening diversity in human personality across history. Sullivan speculated that “there 
are probably a great many different sorts of personality not only because there have 
been a great variety of organism-environment complexes in which these personalities 
were formed, but also because there have been a variety of predetermined (hereditary, 
congenital, somatological) limitations as to evolutionary potentialities.”137 The increasing 
diversity of environment and experience created the possibility of discovering a unique 
sense of self through the unitary processes of interpersonal relations.  
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An individual could personify and assign volition to this sense of self through the 
use of labels “I” and “me.” Sullivan argued that “The personification of the self is what 
you are talking about when you talk about yourself as ‘I,’ and what you are often, if not 
invariably, referring to when you talk about ‘me’ and ‘my.’’138 Human organisms in 
Sullivan’s social and political thought conceived their sense of self in reconciling 
personal inheritances and experiences with perceptions informed by a series of social 
appraisals. The process that constituted the personality engendered historical, 
biological, cultural and social inheritances and experiences. 
Lived and received historical experiences constituted one of the core tenets of 
personality in Sullivan’s social thought. Each individual formed a personality in the 
present by filtering new experiences through the conscious and latent manifestations of 
the past in closely held memories, ideas, symbols, meanings, and historically informed 
fantasies. Sullivan contended in Personal Psychopathology, an unpublished book 
manuscript written in 1929, that an individual’s past experiences continued to exist in the 
personality. He asserted, “The factor of the past experience enters into every total 
situation, and enters so effectively that on occasion the true character of the situation 
may actually be quite beyond the power of the observer to conceive.”139 The past not 
only entered into every total situation but shaped the patterns and perceptions of the 
present moment. “All this leads to the invention of new patterns from the old,” or the 
repetition of old patterns.140 If traumatic historical experiences prevented the patient from 
successfully forming a personality in the present, the psychiatrist could facilitate a 
“dissipating [of] the continuing parataxic influences of unresolved historically past 
situations through which the patient has lived.”141 Parataxic influences shaped 
interpersonal interactions through individuated and distorted relationships projected from 
the real or constructed past onto the present, even if the individual remained unaware of 
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their persistence.142 The psychiatrist and patient subverted individuated practice by 
connecting a single, historical performance to a larger chain of behaviors and ideas. The 
personified self acted or behaved in accord with the unique personality that it named, 
performing through a universal interpersonal process.   
The cultural values assigned to biological characteristics – particularly hereditary, 
congenital, and somatological distinctions – demanded conformity and constrained the 
development of personality. Differences in sexuality, ability, psychology, and gender 
shaped an individual’s perception of the present moment and in so doing became 
engendered in the self. Patrick Mullahy, one of Sullivan’s most devoted students, wrote 
that “there is no way of separating the strictly ‘biological’ from the cultural” in Sullivan’s 
thought.143 Biological interrelations were normalized through Sullivan’s ‘tendency 
systems’ that established the terms of biologically typical relationships in the past and 
present. Social and cultural tendency systems acted through the process of 
interpersonal relations, allowing an individual to identify relatively stable patterns of 
biological characteristics subsumed in their personality.  
Sullivan illustrated the influence of normalizing tendencies that acted on 
biological experiences in case study in the July 1925 issue of American Journal of 
Psychiatry. “P.J.” was consumed with “hating his father with a great hate, and already 
lonely and unhappy when he submits to fellatio for the first time.” Anticipating a “loss of 
esteem in the eyes of others,” P.J. attempted to reclaim his sense of self through a 
“religious sublimation.”144 P.J.’s failure to recover his lost sense of self “gave place to 
rapidly developing and very severe panic.”145 His biological and sexual experiences 
irreparably contradicted the tendency systems established through the religious and 
cultural institutions in his society. The only path toward personality required P.J. to 
discipline his biological experiences to align with the cultural expectations that were 
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embedded in the processes of interpersonal relations. “The underprivileged then 
obviously fail to live up to the rules, and are open to censure and punishment.” Sullivan 
continued, “The tendency systems that have been subjected to this dogmatic thwarting 
in our culture are numerous, but by far the most powerful of them is that manifesting in 
sexual behavior.”146 The normalizing tendencies in interpersonal relations prevented 
many of the patients with whom Sullivan worked as a psychiatrist from successfully 
maintaining a sense of self. Sullivan’s social and political thought acknowledged the 
influence of past and present biological distinctions in creating human variation within 
the universal process of personality acquisition by disciplining differences in sexuality, 
ability, psychology and gender. 
Cultural experiences constituted another of the central aspects of personality, in 
addition to acting in concert with biological processes. Sullivan borrowed his definition of 
culture from anthropology. He noted in the unpublished Personal Psychopathology that 
“Culture is made up of and includes all those entities of the world which are wholly or 
partly products of the human mind. Material culture includes inventions, constructions, 
wealth, and the like. Substantive culture includes languages, mores, customs, folkways, 
law, religion, and other institutions and the like.” In a more succinct passage, Sullivan 
wrote that “By ‘cultural’ I mean what the anthropologist means – all that which is man-
made, which survives as monuments to preexistent man, that is the cultural.”147 Cultural 
inheritances included all artifacts used or acknowledged in interpersonal relations that 
were created by human actors. Sullivan never removed cultural artifacts from the 
processes of interpersonal relations, recognizing that their perpetuation required human 
interactions. Sullivan explained that “since culture is an abstraction pertaining to people, 
that man requires interpersonal relationships, or interchange with others.”148 Sullivan 
applied culture as an abstract category to material and substantive artifacts produced by 
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humans in the past that continued to act through the processes of interpersonal relations 
engendered in the self. 
The social experiences and inheritances engendered in the self were part and 
parcel to psychiatry as a discipline. Sullivan defined psychiatry as “the field of thought 
within which there are insights that seem destined to illuminate some age-old and many 
future problems of living, of the relations of man to man, perhaps even of peoples to 
peoples.”149 The processes personified in the self did not simply exist in a “social 
heritage, but the interpersonal situations through which persons manifest mental health 
or mental disorder.”150 The process of interpersonal relations was structured by social 
organizations. The human “personality is made manifest in interpersonal situations” that 
encompassed “configurations made up of two or more people, all but one of whom may 
be more or less completely illusory.”151 The process of personality forced individuals to 
formulate selfhood through interconnections – real, personified, or parataxic. The 
character of the other mattered less than the perceived relationship between the 
personified self and personified others. “In this connection,” wrote Sullivan, “it must be 
obvious to anyone, that the social milieu to which the patient has to return, has a great 
deal to do with his future.”152 Patterns of social relations and experiences in society were 
a core pillar of Sullivan’s self. 
Sullivan’s theories of self and society established a universal process through 
which individual difference flourished across a myriad of inheritances and experiences. 
But what happened when an individual failed to realize a personality that conformed to 
the historical, biological, cultural and social demands of interpersonal relations? What 
was the consequence of nonconformity to normalized behaviors and ideas in American 
society?  
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This process of incessant change often created a disjuncture between previously 
stable or fixed values that were personified in the self and the changing content and 
direction of experiences in society. Personal disjuncture could be catalyzed by an 
incompatibility between an individual’s biological experiences and the bio-cultural norms 
that disciplined human life, as in the case of Sullivan’s psychiatric patient named P.J.153 
The onset of personal disjuncture could also follow changing historical and social 
conditions beyond the realm of individual control, as in the case of Ella Stack following 
the economic collapse of 1894.154 Collective disjuncture could follow the destabilization 
of collective identity through the introduction of new conditions, as experienced by the 
traditional Yankee-stock residents in Chenango County when frequent economic 
depressions undermined assumed association between hard work and the accumulation 
of wealth.155 The disjuncture highlighted in each of these instances coincided with the 
onset of individual or collective anxiety, or the undirected fear that accompanied an 
incompatibility between the personified self and changing social environment.156 
Affective anxiety prevented the individual from differentiating between the self and the 
environment, precluding the recognition of a source or means of alleviation.157 An 
individual could adapt to the changing environment through sublimation, or the 
“substitution, for a behavior pattern which encounters anxiety or collides with the self-
system, of a socially more acceptable activity pattern which satisfies part of the 
motivational system that caused trouble.”158 Put differently, the onset of anxiety could 
lead to the adoption of coping mechanisms that preserved the self by curtailing the 
process of making the self. 
Individuals often adopted selective inattention, patterned rationalizations, or 
prejudices to cope with anxiety following disjuncture. Sullivan considered these to be a 
“self-deceptive pattern,” or “a way of eliminating awareness of the motive called out by 
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the event, and thus of diminishing the tendency to become informed as to ‘what is going 
on’ in the situation.”159 Selective inattention was a strategy “in which one ignores things 
that do matter; since one has found no way of being secure about them, one excludes 
them from awareness as long as possible.”160 While rationalizations often helped 
individuals discover patterns in their lived experiences, the use of rationalizations in the 
face of anxiety caused individuals to deal with “other people with a wonderful blend of 
magic, illusions, and incoherent irrelevancy.” The rationalization coping tendency was “a 
special aspect of the delusion of unique individuality which is necessitated by the 
peculiar limitations of conceptual ‘me’ and ‘you’ as a governor of one’s perceptions, a 
reference frame that determines the accessibility of one’s experience to awareness.”161 
The patterned rationalizations that an individual developed to cope with anxiety became 
particularly dangerous as a system of personal or collective prejudices. Sullivan noted 
that “instead [of] a series of rationalizations; that is, plausible statements,” an individual 
could cope with affective anxiety by “appealing to prejudices (unwarranted beliefs), held 
by many persons known to the speaker, without particular regard to probability but only 
to interpersonal expediency, to the end that the observer shall defer to the ‘explanations’ 
and thus withdraw the challenge to the other’s self-esteem.”162 Prejudices deployed in 
coping with anxiety often caused the atavistic return of previously accepted beliefs about 
the world that only remained tenable – if ever they were – in so far as these ideas 
remained divorced from the “real” self.  
 The passage of time never fully eradicated prejudicial ideas, but rather 
subordinated them within the material of new ideas and in so doing, preserved the 
potential for these ideas to reappear after a period of dormancy.163 A prejudice once 
accepted as a basis for the self always held the potential to reappear as an explanation 
for the self at a later moment in American history, particularly if that idea could be 
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isolated from the changing currents in the interpersonal process. Virulent prejudices, 
even those that were “eradicated” in the past, would resurface to justify hatred and 
exclusion in each succeeding moment of personal and collective affective uncertainty in 
the United States. 
 The persistence and prevalence of prejudice in American society was a 
consequence of the vast store of accumulated exclusionary rationalizations deeply 
embedded in the personal and collective histories of its people. The religious, racial, 
cultural, and biological distinctions that organized and normalized society remained part 
of the genealogy of American ideas and held the potential to shape selfhood in the 
present. Sullivan recognized that “The roots of any hatred of a collectivity are to be 
sought in influences as widespread as are its manifestations.” Eradicating prejudice 
against Jews or Catholics might be impossible since “the personal origins of these 
particular hostile dynamisms are not intimately related to the influence of economic, 
political, or socio-geographic factors. In hatred of Jews or Catholics, the origin is much 
too early.”164 It was insufficient to refute the explanations that individuals gave for holding 
prejudices, because these reasons masked the far deeper roots of passionately felt 
hatreds. Prejudices remained “complex entities that are relatively uncommunicable, quite 
beyond consensual validation, and therefore unsuited to rationalize the basis of any 
collaborative interpersonal action.”165  
Sullivan argued that the most effective way to penetrate and weaken prejudice 
was to reduce a single prejudiced act to a set of historically reoccurring ideas, doctrines, 
or faiths. Prejudices were often iterated patterns of (previously) acceptable social ideas 
or behavior for which there was no origin, only copies and examples. These ideas and 
behaviors referenced past patterns of hatred that could be rationalized, but were 
disconnected from any concrete social factors. Sullivan argued that anti-Semitic ideas 
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and behaviors in the United States cited the unrecognized patterns of behavior that 
young Christian children learned in Sunday schools across the country.166 The 
recognition of this performance of past social and political norms freed the individual to 
intervene in the behaviors and ideas that constituted the formation of personality in the 
interpersonal realm. Recognizing an act of prejudice as the repetition of historical norms 
made it possible for a therapist – or other committed individual – to undermine the 
prejudice-conforming personality. Hatred stemmed from the significance assigned to 
particular behaviors in the process of interpersonal relations and in reference to social 
norms. Sullivan wrote, “Hatred is an attitude of a person involved in interpersonal 
relations. Unpersonalized objects and abstractions are not hated. Collectivities of people 
are hated only in so far as they are embodied in concrete personalizations or 
personifications.”167 Sullivan hoped to undermine prejudice, destabilize the distorted 
patterns of historical performance that were reenacted in the present, and empower the 
subjectivity of individuals cast to the margins of US society.  
Writing in collaboration with prominent African American sociologist E. Franklin 
Frazier,168 Sullivan argued that “The tragedy of the Negro in America seems to be chiefly 
a matter of culturally determined attitudes in the whites, by the manifestations of which 
the Negro is generally distorted into a pattern of interracial behavior which permits the 
continuance of the attitudes without much change.”169  Swedish economist Gunnar 
Myrdal made a similar argument four years later in An American Dilemma,170 a book that 
challenged ‘separate but equal’ racial policies in the United States and sold 100,000 
copies.171 The resonant prejudices deeply established in white Americans’ sense of self 
continued to structure relations with black Americans in the present. The persistence 
that Sullivan observed in the distorted, prejudicial attitude of whites toward blacks was 
the consequence of social atavism, with previously held discredited “social truths” 
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returning to protect a tenuously constructed white sense of self in a changing society. 
Racist ideas functioned through social interactions within political and social institutions 
to preserve the value assigned to white identity in the United States. Sullivan’s theories 
of the self historicized prejudices as atavistic beliefs subsumed in an intellectual 
genealogy. Beliefs about human difference were part of an ever-changing process of 
interpersonal relations that was personified in the self and could only be made stable by 
insulating ideas and behaviors from the social and personal reality of American life. 
Sullivan’s life outside of mainstream society and privileged academic spaces precipitated 
his participation in an ongoing conversation on the concept of selfhood and incited his 
desire to discover a new form of humanism that embraced a greater diversity of human 
beings and experiences. 
IV. The Search for a Social and Political Theory of Humanism 
 “It is profoundly disturbing,” wrote Sullivan in 1942 on the possible creation of a 
global community after war, “that no moving conviction of the universal worth and dignity 
of man exists.”172 Intellectuals from disparate disciplines and from around the globe 
joined in common cause after World War II to restore a lost sense of collective human 
worth and dignity.173 Postwar intellectuals injected new energy in an interdisciplinary 
conversation around the self and society. These conversations were often hailed as a 
new discourse on humanism or human rights, but in reality represented an important sea 
change in the long history of the Western world’s most frequently reoccurring intellectual 
preoccupation.174 The inclusion of thinkers from a wider range of personal backgrounds 
and academic disciplines under the banner of humanism expanded the conversation and 
coincided with the invention of radically innovative methods of addressing the prescient 
need to establish a new, shared foundation of individuality in a moment of grave 
uncertainty. Harry Stack Sullivan exemplifies the commitment of innovative political 
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theorists writing at the margins of white, mainstream society to incite foundational 
changes to the ideas and identities that defined the postwar milieu. Sullivan, once a 
poor, gay, Irish-Catholic who became a psychiatrist after failing to earn his bachelor’s 
degree, experienced first-hand the prejudice and racism that this new, global discourse 
on humanism intended to overcome. From his earliest childhood memories in upstate 
New York through the final days of his professional career in a discipline that still 
categorized homosexuality as a medical disease, Sullivan remained committed to 
leveraging his own experiences to advance the cause of humanism and the unity of 
human beings around the globe.175  
The ongoing conversation to which Sullivan contributed extended from liberal 
political theory through the postwar era. Sullivan entered this conversation equipped with 
a broad set of interdisciplinary tools, a trove of data accumulated through clinical 
observation, and personal experiences on the edges of American society. Sullivan’s 
unique positionality enabled his novel hypotheses that diverged in important ways from 
previous knowledge of the self and society. Given the influence of his background and 
life experiences on his understanding of the self, it is reasonable to argue that Sullivan is 
an important forbearer of queer individuality. It is entirely valid to argue that Sullivan’s 
experiences writing as a gay man in a discipline that still classified homosexuality as a 
diagnosable medical condition led him to develop a methodology that anticipates the 
hallmarks of queer theory at the end of the twentieth century. However, that is not the 
argument that I intend to make in this piece. 
I argue that Mark Greif aptly identified the unfortunate tendency of intellectual 
historians to ignore the 1940s as an interim period or extension of the decades that 
precede and succeed it; yet, I join Angus Burgin in arguing that Greif’s sole reliance on 
literature as the medium of intellectual production ignores those individuals at the 
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margins of American social and academic life who developed novel theories of 
humanism articulated through the language of political theory. These intellectuals 
grappled with features of American life that were largely ignored by established 
academics in the 1930s and 40s and, in the process, established new methods and 
subjects that were eventually incorporated in the very institutions from which they were 
barred. Sullivan exemplifies the commitment that these intellectuals shared to 
challenging existing ideas in imagining foundational changes to American society in the 
interwar and postwar eras.  
Sullivan’s theories established a dynamic process of ‘interpersonal relations’ 
through which the individual located the self within a shared social space. The process 
of becoming oneself changed constantly and established the preconditions that made 
future change possible. Engaging with others through interpersonal relations brought 
together historical, biological, cultural, and social experiences of the past and present in 
an individual. Sullivan’s theory united human beings – whom he considered to have 
more in common than not – through a process of becoming and made possible a 
boundless diversity of human characteristics. Human diversity became a product of 
history, the inevitable consequence of individual and collective differences. Yet, the 
process of arriving at a unique sense of self was fundamentally the same for all people 
and peoples. Sullivan made human diversity an integral part of humanist social and 
political theory. Human diversity allowed individuals to recognize all that was held in 
common and appreciate the different experiences that made possible a faith in their 
uniqueness as individuals. 
Sullivan’s self-identification as one of the twentieth century’s ‘lonely ones’ is key 
to understanding his unique contributions. He was socially isolated from his earliest days 
on the farm in upstate New York. Loneliness characterized his studies at Cornell, clinical 
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associations, intellectual relationships, and even his legacy after death; with his longtime 
partner Jimmy Inscoe burning his personal effects to protect him from further prejudice. 
Sullivan hoped that his ideas would alleviate human loneliness – his patient’s, his 
colleague’s, and his own. He created a theory of socially informed selfhood that included 
a way for those who did not feel at home in society to create new communities for 
themselves and others like them.176 Sullivan anticipated a postwar era that saw more 
and more Americans question how they knew who they really were and who frequently 
reported that their lives were lonely. 
David Riesman and the midcentury social scientists saw the rise of suburbia as a 
source of widespread loneliness and uncertainty. In 1950, Riesman wrote in The Lonely 
Crowd that “What is more, it is no longer clear which way is up even if one wants to rise, 
for with the growth of the new middle class the older, hierarchical patterns disintegrate, 
and it is not easy to compare ranks among the several sets of hierarchies that do 
exist.”177 The middle-class was frustrated with their recently discovered inability to 
control the social norms with which they were expected to conform. For Sullivan and 
countless intellectuals at the margins of American life, this control could not be lost, 
because it had never existed in the first place.  
Sullivan remains a largely overlooked intellectual who contributed insightful 
answers to questions of who we are and how we relate to one another in an ever-
changing world. Yet, Sullivan is just one example. Intellectual history matters because 
ideas matter.  Ideas help us to develop a sense of who we are as individuals, locate our 
place in and potential contribution to our society, establish a sense of collective purpose, 
and provide reassurance in an unpredictable world. Intellectual histories that look 
exclusively to the thought produced in academically privileged spaces will always 
commit the error that John Stuart Mill once described as “mistaking part of the truth for 
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the whole.”178 How can Sullivan challenge us to write more inclusive histories of thinkers 
and their thoughts? What new knowledge might be produced by expanding the breadth 
and depth of achievements included in American intellectual history? What new things 
will the process of discovering intellectual continuities and discontinuities in previously 
overlooked spaces teach us about ourselves and our past? I hope that additional 
scholarship will continue to pose these questions and countless others in the years 
ahead. 
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